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Abstract
Conventional wisdom holds that left-of-center parties ought to do bet-
ter in elections with higher rates of turnout. There have been numer-
ous studies examining the theoretical roots and empirical results of
the partisan effects of turnout. We address the conventional wisdom
relating turnout with partisan consequences with data collected from
postwar elections in Belgium and the Netherlands. Voting is compul-
sory in Belgium, and was compulsory in the Netherlands between 1917
and 1970. If the conventional wisdom is correct, we should observe a
decline in vote share among leftist parties in the Netherlands under
the treatment condition relative to pre-1970, or to the Belgian control
case. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, we find leftist
Dutch parties have benefited from lower turnout. We demonstrate
this unconventional finding using difference-in-differences and match-
ing methods. We then turn to survey data to examine characteristics
of Dutch abstainers in a set of elections (1971-2006), and speculate
that abolishing compulsory voting in Belgium would marginally in-
crease the leftist vote share in Flanders, but have no effect in Wallo-
nia.
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The partisan implications embedded in variations in voter turnout is a
core question in the field of electoral research. The question is an important
one, because while the normative claim is that higher turnout rates are desir-
able, a high level of turnout might benefit one party over another (Hansford
and Gomez, 2010). Consequently, a large number of papers have been writ-
ten on this question with the aim of finding out whether the vote share of
particular parties is positively affected by higher turnout rates. While dif-
ferent in methods and geographical scope–and by no means conclusive–one
trope that emerges from the literature is that parties on the left benefit from
higher rates of turnout.
The debate is still ongoing and the question is addressed with a wide vari-
ety of methods and types of data. Most of the studies on this topic, however,
are confined to the context of the United States. In the current paper, we
move beyond this context and investigate the partisan effects of turnout in
the Low Countries. The fact that compulsory voting in the Netherlands was
abolished in 1970 offers a unique opportunity to assess the conventional wis-
dom from the perspective of declining turnout following from the abolition
of compulsory voting.
We test this bit of conventional wisdom of the left benefiting from high
turnout by means of election data from Belgium and the Netherlands since
the Second World War. Belgium has mandated voting in elections since
1893 (Robson, 1923, 572). Voting was compulsory in the Netherlands be-
tween 1917 and 1970 (Irwin, 1974). This change to electoral statute provides
a quasi-experimental context (the treatment condition is not randomly de-
termined and thus this study is not a pure experimental design) to test the
conventional wisdom that leftist parties do better when turnout is higher. If
the conventional wisdom is correct, we should observe a decrease in the vote
share of Dutch leftist parties in the post-reform period, when compared to
either 1) the pre-reform period in the Netherlands or 2) the control case of
Belgian leftist parties.
The outline of the paper is as follows. First, we review the literature
on the partisan effects of turnout, discuss the validity of our case selection,
and address how this project expands the general knowledge of turnout.
Second, we describe the data used in our analyses, and the methods we use
to actually analyze the data. Third, we present our findings. Lastly, we
conclude with a few remarks about the relationship between turnout, vote
share, and government formation in Belgium and the Netherlands.
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Partisan Effects of Turnout
Compulsory voting itself has a number of systemic effects. Most obviously,
compulsory voting increases turnout (Jaitman, 2013, Blais, 2006, Geys, 2006).
Compulsory voting has been shown to increase the effective number of par-
ties (Jensen and Spoon, 2011) and reduce the gap between the electorate’s
interests and the interests present in the legislature (Jaitman, 2013, Louth
and Hill, 2005, Hooghe and Pelleriaux, 1998). Other research, however, finds
compulsory voting induces uninterested and less knowledgeable voters to cast
a ballot (Selb and Lachat, 2009).
But what about the effects of high turnout–and by logical association–
compulsory voting on partisan outcomes? This is a question often examined
in the literature. The conventional wisdom that leftist parties benefit due
to increased turnout endures, despite considerable evidence from a variety of
case studies showing it is misplaced.
That election laws have political and partisan consequences is well known,
and has been for some time now (Grofman and Lijphart, 1986). Electoral laws
that touch upon turnout, then, attract considerable attention from political
parties and public officials–lest they lose standing in a new electoral regime–
and from academics keen to study the effects of an electoral change.
DeNardo (1980) presents the predominant formal theoretical model ex-
plaining the partisan effects of high turnout. In an instance of high turnout
we should expect the out-party to do better than in an instance of low
turnout. High turnout elections mobilize a greater proportion of the elec-
torate, and thus bring along voters with a more tenuous level of political
knowledge and partisan affiliation, voters who are more likely to defect from
their partisan loyalties. In short, “campaigners for the minority party should
celebrate when the fickle periphery turns out in force” (DeNardo, 1980, 418).
Whether turnout on its own is sufficient to change an electoral result remains
an open question. Kohler and Rose (2010) describe a number of boundary
conditions in addition to turnout, such as the electoral system, the number of
competing parties, and the gap between the winning and runner-up parties
that could alter an election result.
Australia provides an innovative case to test the conventional link between
turnout and the vote share of the left. Australia has practiced compulsory
voting since 1911. Fowler (2013) uses a difference-in-differences model to find
the Labor vote increased following the implementation of compulsory voting.
What would happen to the vote shares of the parties if, somehow, voting was
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made voluntary? McAllister (1986) extrapolates from the 5% of voters who
did not cast a ballot in 1977 and finds that, consistent with the conventional
wisdom, lower turnout benefits the right-of-center Liberal-National alliance
at the expense of the left-of-center Labor vote. Studies from the 1996 election
also find a similar benefit for the Labor party by examining either a survey
question about party preferences if voting was voluntary (Mackerras and
McAllister, 1999) or through a study of item non-response (Jackman, 1999).
Other cases suggest particular elections where an increase in turnout may
have altered the result. Simulating complete turnout in German elections
suggests the left-of-center Social Democrats may have won the 1994 and 2005
elections (Kohler, 2011). Pacek and Radcliff show traditional (i.e. material-
ist) leftist parties benefited from high turnout between 1950 and 1990 (1995),
and that leftist parties in the European Parliament benefited from increased
turnout (2003). A similar trend is present among the post-Soviet elections in
the 1990s, where increased turnout benefits leftist parties at the expense of
the conservative and nationalist parties (Bohrer et al., 2000). Higher turnout
in the 1980 and 2000 Presidential elections in the United States may have
led to Democratic victories (Brunell and DiNardo, 2004). Conversely, Lutz
(2007) finds increased turnout would benefit right-of-center parties in Swiss
elections. Wuffle and Collet (1997) “irrefutably” demonstrate Republicans in
the United States benefit from higher turnout, to the point that they wonder
why the Democrats even bother to vote. Grofman (1998) questions both
the Wuffle turnout effects research design and the results Wuffle and Collet
report.
The United States has often been a case study in this literature, though
the preponderance of findings do not lend credibility to the conventional wis-
dom (Grofman et al., 1999). There is little evidence of a partisan turnout bias
in American Presidential elections between 1828 and 1976 (Fenton, 1979).
Martinez and Gill (2005), by contrast, find a Democratic bias in earlier elec-
tions that fades away in the post-1960s period. Senatorial and Gubernato-
rial elections mirror a similar process, where a turnout bias in favor of the
Democrats vanishes since 1965 (Nagel and McNulty, 1996). Democratic Sen-
atorial candidates may benefit from increased turnout, but the magnitude
of this benefit is small and unlikely to alter an election result (Citrin et al.,
2003). In short, it is not the case that high turnout consistently benefits the
Democrats; on occasion Republican candidates can benefit from increased
turnout (Kaufmann et al., 2008, 145-161).
Saglie and colleagues (2012) examine turnout and the Labour party share
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of the vote in Norwegian local elections, and find the two variables are not ca-
sually related. Van der Eijk and van Egmond (2007, 570) examine European
Parliament elections–where turnout is chronically low1 and thus expected to
advantage right-of-center parties–but find only “exceedingly weak” results
that are not indicative of a general trend. Fisher (2007) finds an association
between turnout and vote share of leftist parties in national elections, but
argues that this association is not causally determined, that the two trends
are operating independently.
A separate stream challenging the conventional linkage between turnout
and the leftist parties examines the preferences of non-voters and then esti-
mates a plausible vote share for each party under simulated higher turnout.
Rubenson and colleagues (2007) apply this logic to the 2000 Canadian Fed-
eral election. They find voters’ preferences to be largely representative of the
electorate as a whole, and thus universal turnout would be unlikely to alter
the election result. Sides and colleagues (2008) apply this logic to United
States Presidential contests between 1996 and 2004, and find that universal
turnout would have not changed election results. In contrast to this line of
studies, Petterson and Rose (2007) use party sympathy scores to model the
effect of universal turnout in Norwegian parliamentary elections, but find
only marginal effects.
Is it also the case that lower turnout benefits the rightist parties? Evi-
dence from New Zealand suggests this corollary to the conventional wisdom
is misplaced. Nagel (1988, 26) finds that a decrease in turnout of ten per-
centage points is associated with a drop of 7.77 points in the vote share of
the Labour party, and a rise of 9.4 points in the vote share of the minor
parties. Estimating complete turnout in a comparative context reveals the
main beneficiaries of increased turnout are small parties and non-incumbents
(Bernhagen and Marsh, 2007). McAllister and Mughan (1986) find that the
British Liberals–the predecessor to the contemporary Liberal Democrats–and
not the Labour party are the beneficiaries of higher turnout in British elec-
tions between 1964 and 1983. Martins and Viega (2014) find higher turnout
disadvantages right-of-center parties in Portuguese legislative elections, but
that higher turnout does not benefit the left-of-center parties.
1Franklin (2001) demonstrates that low turnout in European Parliament elections is
due, in large part, to the diminished proportion of member states with compulsory voting.
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Case Selection
We investigate the partisan impact of turnout by treating the abolition of
compulsory voting in the Netherlands as a quasi-natural experiment. There-
fore, we consider elections in Belgium as the control condition. The validity
of our approach hence depends on the comparability of both countries. As
Deschouwer (2002, p. 151) has argued, “Belgium and the Netherlands are
often taken and presented together as the ‘Low Countries’, and there are
good reasons for treating the two countries as part of a single category.” In-
deed, on a many social and political dimensions, there are marked similarities
between the two countries which render these cases ideal for our analytical
purposes. Importantly, the Netherlands and Belgium have a shared history
and even though important differences in terms of language and religion are
linked to their separation in 1830 (Fishman, 1988), both countries still have
a lot in common (Deschouwer, 2002). Belgium and the Netherlands are not
only neighboring countries, they are also both relatively small countries that
at the same time are at the heart of the European Union and were forerun-
ners in the process of European integration as founding member states of the
European Coal and Steel Community (Cini and Borragan, 2013). Belgium
and the Netherlands are also economically similar in the sense that they
are both transit economies (Hemerijck and Visser, 2000). Furthermore, the
media-systems in the Netherlands and Belgium are very similar as well, and
have long been dominated by strong party press (Van Aelst et al., 2008).
At a purely political level, then, both countries use a proportional elec-
toral system (and the D’Hondt method) for allocating seats (Carstairs, 1980).
Both countries are consociational, multi-party systems with a strong tradi-
tion of coalition governments (Lijphart, 2012, Timmermans and Moury, 2006,
Timmermans, 2003, De Winter et al., 2000, Timmermans and Andeweg, 2000,
Peterson et al., 1983). In his analysis of Westminster and consensus models
of democracy, Lijphart (2012, 239-254) finds the Netherlands and Belgium
are closely related to each other across the ten criteria used to define the
executive-parties and federal-unitary dimensions. Party competition in both
countries is marked by competition between “party families” of Christian
democrats, socialists, and liberals (Deschouwer, 2002, Irwin, 1989). Further-
more, societies in both countries are clearly characterized by what Rokkan
(1977) labeled ‘verzuiling’ with pillar parties as key players dominating ev-
ery aspect in the lives of ‘their’ electorates. It is clear, however, that by now
there is an erosion of the pillarization in both countries, although this process
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has started somewhat later in Belgium (Deschouwer, 2002).
We, thus, feel safe describing Belgium and the Netherlands as “most sim-
ilar” cases (Peters, 1998, 36-41). The political systems in these two countries
are remarkably similar, with the obvious exception that voting is compul-
sory in Belgium and (at least since 1970) optional in the Netherlands. This
variation in election law serves as a sorting criterion to distinguish between
a control group where voting is compulsory (Belgium and pre-1970 Nether-
lands) and an experiment group where voting is substantially lower due to
the abolition of compulsory voting (post-1970 Netherlands).
Data and Methods
We have collected a set of elections data from Belgium and the Netherlands
to measure the partisan effects of turnout. These data cover 42 elections
(21 in either country) between 1946 and 2012 and include 397 parliamentary
parties (199 in Belgium and 198 in the Netherlands).2 At the national level,
we have data on turnout (measured as the number of valid ballots cast among
the electorate), the effective number of parties (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979),
a dummy variable indicating the use of compulsory voting, and the growth
rate of the gross domestic product in the election year and the year prior.
For each parliamentary party we have collected data on the vote and seat
share, whether the party was part of the governing coalition, and the position
of the party on a left-right dimension. These data are initially collected at
the provincial level in Belgium and then aggregated to the national level to
be comparable to national-level data in the Netherlands. Summary statistics
for Belgium and the Netherlands are included in Table 1.
The position of the parties on a left-right dimension are given by data
from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al., 2001, Klingemann
et al., 2006). The CMP conducts a text-based analysis of the contents of
party platforms to place parliamentary parties somewhere on a scale between
100 and -100, with leftist parties closer to the negative end of the scale. In
our data, the average party position in Belgium (161 parties, mean -3.89,
2By parliamentary party we mean a party that won at least one seat in an election.
We exclude all parties that failed to gain a seat in parliament.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Belgium and the Netherlands
1946-1970 1971-2012
Belgium
Number of elections 8 13
Average turnout 87.1% 85.92%
Average effective number of parties 3.4 8.31
Average vote share for all leftist parties 38.49% 32.6%
Netherlands
Number of elections 7 14
Average turnout 94.7% 80.4%
Average effective number of parties 4.92 5.4
Average vote share for all leftist parties 34.4% 43.3%
Effective number of parties is calculated on the basis of votes.
standard deviation 15.94) is not significantly different from the Netherlands
(127 parties, mean -2.89, standard deviation 18.71). The CMP does not
estimate party positions for minor parties with only a handful of seats. The
largest party with a missing CMP position value is the Communist party.3
Turnout in the two countries is shown in Figure 1. We observe a signif-
icant decrease in turnout in the Netherlands following the abolition of com-
pulsory voting in 1970. Average turnout in Belgium has remained steady over
time, from about 87% in the pre-1970 period to about 86% in the post-1970
period. Turnout in the Netherlands, by contrast, has decreased substantially
from about 95% in the pre-reform years to about 80% in the post-reform
years.
We get a somewhat different picture when we look at the vote shares.
Figure 2 graphs the proportion of the vote won by all left-of-center parties
in Belgium and the Netherlands. In the pre-reform years, the leftist parties
in both countries won, on average, slightly more than a third of the vote
(38.5% in Belgium and 34.4% in the Netherlands). In the post-reform years,
however, the Dutch left won an average of 43.3% of the vote while the Belgian
left reduced its average share of the vote to 32.6%. Indeed, the Dutch left
never won 40% of the vote in the period 1946-1967, but won less than 40%
3The Belgian Communist party held 23 seats after the 1946 election and 12 after the
1949 election. Thereafter the party steadily lost seats until vanishing after the 1981 elec-
tions. The Dutch Communist party held 10 seats after the 1946 elections, and thereafter
lost seats until disappearing after the 1982 elections. We have no reason to suggest the
findings we report below are biased by the omission of data on the position of the Com-
munist parties in either country.
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Figure 1: Turnout in Belgium and the Netherlands 1946-2012
of the vote only in the 2002 elections and in the face of the emergence of the
right-wing List Pim Fortuyn (Van Holsteyn and Irwin, 2003, Pennings and
Keman, 2003).
We employ a series of statistical methods to assess if turnout is signifi-
cantly related to vote shares by partisan group. We first estimate a standard
difference-in-differences model to assess the effect of lower turnout in post-
1970 Netherlands on the vote share won by all left-of-center parties. Follow-
ing from these results, we then match individual parties from both countries
to test the robustness of the DID results. Lastly, we examine survey data
from the Netherlands to suggest a series of explanations for the trends in
turnout we observe, and use a 2009 survey from Belgium to speculate that
abolishing compulsory voting would marginally increase the leftist vote share
in Flanders.
For testing the individual-level mechanism linking turnout and voting for
leftist parties, we rely on election survey data. For the Dutch electoral con-
text, we make use of the cumulative file of the Dutch Parliamentary Election
Studies (1971-2006). This dataset contains repeated cross-sectional observa-
tions of representative and random sample national election surveys in the
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Figure 2: Leftist Vote Share in Belgium and the Netherlands 1946-2012
Netherlands (Todosijevic, B. and Van Der Kaap, 2010). The full dataset
holds information on 22,821 individuals and spans 12 elections. For the
current analyses, 19,070 valid observations are included (see Table 4). All
election surveys were collected independently, but the cumulative dataset
contains identical and harmonized variables for each survey (Schmeets and
Van Der Bie, 2008). As a result, the dataset is well-suited for a pooled
analysis of voting behavior in the Netherlands. For the Belgian electoral
context, we make use of the data of the PartiRep Belgian election study.
These data were collected at the occasion of the 2009 regional elections in
Belgium. While the data had a panel-component, we only make use of in-
formation from the first pre-electoral wave. For the purposes of our analysis,
the data contain information on 2,236 valid observations.
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Findings
Aggregate Level Analyses
First, we adopt a difference-in-differences model4 to measure the effect of
decreased turnout in the Netherlands post 1970 relative to the pre-reform
period, and to the Belgian control case. We estimate a linear regression of
the form
Vij = β0 + β1P + β2CV + β3(P · CV ) +  (1)
where Vij is the vote share, P is a dummy variable for the left-of-center
parties in both countries, CV is the treatment (i.e. the abolition of compul-
sory voting in the Netherlands) and P ·CV is the interaction between these
two dichotomous variables. If the conventional wisdom is correct, P · CV
will be negative and significant.
Table 2 shows results from two linear models relating turnout and vote
share. We find, contrary to the conventional wisdom, that lower turnout
appears to benefit leftist parties in the Netherlands by, on average and across
all leftist parties, about 16 percentage points. The Dutch parties are not
significantly different from the Belgian parties–a sign that the two countries
are similar. Furthermore, the fit of this linear model is not markedly improved
by including additional control variables for the effective number of parties,
the election year, or the growth rate of the gross domestic product in the
year preceding an election.5
Party Level Analyses
We use a nearest-neighbor matching model to assess the robustness of the
findings in Table 2. Estimates of a treatment effect can be calculated by
comparing an outcome for a treated unit to one or more untreated units with
a similar set of characteristics. In this way an observer is able to estimate the
4See Angrist and Pischke (2009, 227-241) for a discussion of difference-in-differences
and (Card and Krueger, 1994) for a notable application of this method.
5These results do not differ in terms of sign, magnitude, or significance if we include
the GDP growth rate in the year of an election, or per capita GDP in either year.
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Table 2: Leftist Vote Share and Compulsory Voting
Vote Share (a) (b)
Netherlands -0.006 -0.008
(0.011) (0.014)
Leftist Parties -0.271*** -0.285***
(0.010) (0.010)
Voluntary Voting -0.066*** -0.074***
(0.014) (0.019)
Leftist*Voluntary Voting 0.156*** 0.169***
(0.017) (0.016)
Effective Parties -0.002
(0.003)
Year 0.000
(0.000)
GDPe−1 0.000
(0.002)
Constant 0.620*** 0.539
(0.007) (0.893)
Observations 84 72
R2 0.917 0.936
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: The effect of voluntary voting on vote share
All Parties Leftist Parties
ATT N ATT N
Matching within country 0.039** (0.017) 288 0.062*** (0.022) 110
Matching without country 0.028 (0.019) 288 0.052** (0.026) 110
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.
counterfactual case of no treatment a means to overcome one shortcoming of
regression analysis.
Table 3 shows the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) esti-
mated by matching a single treated party with at least two untreated par-
ties.6 We separately estimate the ATT for all Belgian and Dutch parties,
and for a model including–and, alternatively, excluding–the country dummy
variable in the matching criteria. In addition to a country dummy variable,
we match observations by election turnout, election year, and party position
scores calculated by the Comparative Manifesto Project.
These results lend further support to the difference-in-differences results
reported in Table 2. The treatment condition significantly increases the vote
share of a leftist party by, on average, 6.2 percentage points when compared
to pre-reform Dutch party data, and by an average of 5.2 percentage points
when the treated Dutch leftist parties are compared to the set of all parties.
Our aggregate-level findings are in contradiction to the commonly held
view that left from center parties would lose by the abolition of compulsory
voting. Our results point out that leftist parties in the Netherlands are
doing significantly better in elections after compulsory voting was abolished.
It remains to be seen, therefore, whether we could infer from those results
that especially voters preferring non-left parties are prone to abstain from
voting in the low countries. In a final step, therefore, we employ data from the
Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (1971-2006) and from the 2009 Belgian
regional election survey to assess the results of the abolition of compulsory
voting on an individual level.
6The maximum number of untreated cases for each treated case ranges between 3 and
4.
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Examining Dutch Survey Data
We first assess the characteristics of individual non-voters–recall that Ir-
win (1974) found those alienated from the political system are less likely to
vote–in the Netherlands by means of the data from the Dutch Parliamentary
Election Studies (DPES). Doing so, we have to be aware of the fact that a
social desirability bias causes respondents to falsely report that they turned
out to voted, which is why turnout is generally over-reported in post-electoral
surveys (Ansolabehere and Hersh, 2012, Karp and Brockington, 2005). Con-
sequently, the number of respondents reporting not to have voted is usually
rather low. As this holds for the DPES as well, we make use of the pooled
data of several Dutch election surveys in order to have a large enough pool of
abstainers to engage in meaningful analyses. As clear from Table 4, overall
about 8% of the respondents in the DPES report not to have turned out to
vote. While a minority, on a total of over 19,070 respondents, this amount
does give us some leverage for statistically assessing the characteristics of
abstainers.
Table 4: Dutch Left Voters, Non-Left Voters, and Abstainers by election year
Election year Other party Left party Abstained N
1971 57 29 14 1,855
1972 62 27 11 1,442
1977 53 38 9 1,398
1981 57 37 7 1,588
1982 55 33 11 1,497
1986 54 39 7 1,335
1989 47 45 8 1,480
1994 46 46 8 1,493
1998 40 50 9 1,758
2002 58 39 3 1,566
2003 48 47 5 1,268
2006 51 42 7 2,390
Total 52 39 8 19,070
Source: DPES 1971-2006
We assess the characteristics of abstainers and compare them to the char-
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acteristics of those voting for leftist and non-leftist parties respectively. By
doing so we can assess whether abstainers are closer to either the left or to
the right. The inference we make is that if abstainers are more alike voters
choosing leftist parties, a higher turnout or a system of compulsory voting
would be beneficial to leftist parties.
Before investigating abstainers’ political attitudes and their position on
issues, we have a look at some socio-demographic variables. It is widely
known that non-voters tend to be younger, lower educated, and belong to
lower social strata compared to voters (Blais, 2000, Leighley and Nagler,
2013, Gallego, 2010). Additionally, women are generally less likely to turn out
to vote than male voters. As clear from the descriptive statistics presented
in Figure 3, while there are no significant differences in terms of gender,
abstainers are indeed younger, lower educated and belong to lower social
strata compared to voters. The data of the DPES furthermore illustrate that
in terms of age, social class or income, non-voters are more similar to voters
choosing leftist parties than they are to voters of other parties. In terms
of socio-demographic characteristics, therefore, the individual-level results
are in line with common wisdom. Only focusing on socio-demographics, we
would expect non-voters to vote for leftist parties if they were obliged to turn
out.
Self-evidently, other than socio-structural variables are often linked to
turnout. There is a rich literature linking political attitudes such as interest
in politics, strong feelings of efficacy, and trust to political participation
(Gronlund and Setala, 2007, Hetherington, 1999, Karp and Banducci, 2008).
Figure 4 shows that low levels of interest in politics and a decreased sense of
efficacy is associated with abstention. Comparing the political attitudes of
abstainers with those of voters for left or other parties, it is clear that the
main difference is one between voters and non-voters. We could not state
that either left- or non-left-leaning voters are more alike abstainers in terms
of these general political attitudes.
It seems as if neither the socio-demographic characteristics nor the polit-
ical attitudes of leftist voters in the Netherlands can provide an explanation
regarding why leftist parties did significantly better after the abolition of
compulsory voting in the Netherlands. In a next step, therefore, we look at
respondents’ position on a number of issues that are often framed in terms
of left and right. First, we look at respondents’ self placement on a 0 to 10
left-right scale. As evident from the upper left graph in Figure 5, abstain-
ers place themselves at the ideological center. With a mean self-placement
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score of 4.96, they are at about an equal ideological distance of voters of
leftist (3.44) and non-leftist (6.37) parties. The distributions on a general
left-right-scale, therefore, would not lead us to conclude that either the left
or the right would win if all abstainers were obliged to turn out to vote.
The policy issues included in these data allow us to see where abstainers
stand relative to the left parties. Abstainers appear to be centrist in terms
of a classical left-right issue as whether income difference should be smaller
(more to the left is a preference for smaller income differences). Addition-
ally, abstainers can be defined as centrist in terms of ethical issues such as
euthanasia or a typical environmentalist issue as whether or not there should
be nuclear plants. The most noteworthy finding in Figure 5, however, is to be
seen in the two final graphs. Looking at respondents’ attitudes with regard
to typical conservative issues such as the position towards ethnic minori-
ties or attitudes towards crime, abstainers are clearly right-leaning. As the
descriptive statistics indicate, abstainers are stressing significantly stronger
that ethnic minorities have to adjust to the Dutch culture than voters of left-
ist parties. Furthermore, abstainers stress more strongly than leftist voters
that the Dutch government should act tougher on crime.
We started this individual-level analysis from the finding that at an aggre-
gate level the left has surprisingly benefited from the abolition of compulsory
voting in the Netherlands. The individual-level analyses make clear that with
respect to some central socio-demographic characteristics abstainers have a
lot in common with the left electorate. This would then lead to the con-
clusion that leftist parties should have lost–and not won–when compulsory
voting was abolished. A closer look at citizens’ positions on different political
issues, however, does give some insights on the mechanism causing the left
not to suffer from the abolition of compulsory voting. While abstainers are in
general to be defined as ideologically centrist, they are clearly right-leaning
when it comes to issues as migration or crime. Consequently, to the extent
that such issues dominate election campaigns, the right would suffer and the
left would benefit from low turnout.
The Dutch data allow us to compare the characteristics of abstainers with
those of leftist voters and non-leftist voters. As such, the analyses provide
some hints explaining why the left has gained from the abolition of com-
pulsory voting in the Netherlands. The data do not provide insights on the
precise individual-level vote choice effect of the fact that compulsory voting
was abolished. To this end, we would need panel data following the same
respondents before and after 1970. Unfortunately, no such data are available
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for the Dutch context. As an alternative, we fall back on a hypothetical ques-
tion on the abolition of compulsory voting that was included in the Belgian
2009 regional election survey.7
The question included in the 2009 election survey is the following: “If
voting for parliament was no longer obliged in Belgium, would you always,
most of the time, sometimes or never go out to vote?” A number of scholars
have previously relied on hypothetical questions of this type to investigate the
partisan effects of the abolition of compulsory voting (Hooghe and Pelleriaux,
1998, Mackerras and McAllister, 1999). The use of such questions, however,
has also been criticized. Jackman (1999) for example has warned for the
impact of social desirability effects as well as a response bias when using this
type of survey question for making inferences on the abolition of compulsory
voting. We should hence interpret the results of the analyses on the 2009
election survey data with some caution.
We follow the same analytical strategy as Hooghe and Pelleriaux (1998)
have done for investigating how the election results would look like if voting
was no longer compulsory in Belgium. Depending on their reported proba-
bility to vote if not obliged to, respondents were assigned different weights.
Respondents reporting to always vote were assigned a weight of 1.00, those
reporting to vote most of the time were assigned a weight of 0.75, those who
would sometimes vote were assigned a weight of 0.25 and those who reported
to never vote were assigned a weight of 0.00. In order to assess the parti-
san impact of the abolition of compulsory voting, we subsequently present
the proportion of left voters with and without this weighting correction. As
Belgium basically consists of two different party systems (a Francophone one
and a Flemish one), this was done for the two language groups separately.
As clear from the results in Table 5, in the Flemish electoral space the
left might benefit somewhat from the abolition of compulsory voting. The
estimated vote share the left would have gained if voting was not compulsory
in 2009 is higher than in a context with compulsory voting. As a point of
nuance, however, we should stress that the 95% confidence intervals are quite
wide and overlap. Still, the fact that the left is estimated to obtain a higher
vote share in Flanders if compulsory voting were abolished provides further
evidence to our finding that in the low countries, the left wins and not loses
7Belgium regional elections cannot be considered second order national elections. The
dynamics at a regional level are very similar to what holds for the federal elections (De-
schouwer, 2009).
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Table 5: The partisan effect of abolishing compulsory voting in Belgium
Compulsory voting No compulsory voting
Left vote share (Flemish) 23.93 27.17
[21.44;26.42] [24.13; 30.20]
Left vote share (French) 52.20 52.76
[49.11; 55.30] [49.19; 56.33]
Source: 2009 Belgian regional election study (PartiRep).
from abolishing compulsory voting. For the Francophone electoral space,
then, the abolition of compulsory voting would have virtually no partisan
effect.
Conclusions
Since at least the 1932 landslide victory of Democrat Franklin Roosevelt over
Republican incumbent Herbert Hoover in the American presidential election,
it has been thought that higher turnout benefits the Democrats in the United
States and, more generally, the parties of the left. This bit of conventional
wisdom has been tested in a variety of settings, and often found lacking.
Nonetheless, the conventional wisdom endures.
Our intent is not to be the last word in this debate but, rather, to con-
tribute an exceptional case to the general knowledge of turnout and its par-
tisan effects. We depart from the typical research design by measuring the
effects of the decline in turnout following the Dutch abolition of compulsory
voting in 1970. Furthermore, we take advantage of the close similarity be-
tween the Netherlands and Belgium to measure vote shares for the Dutch
parties in a quasi-natural experiment vis-a`-vis a comparable Belgian control
group. Contrary to the conventional wisdom and the extant literature, we
find the decrease in turnout in post-1970 Netherlands contributed to a signif-
icant boost in vote share for leftist parties in the Netherlands on the order of
5 to 6 percentage points. Our analysis of Belgian survey data from 2009 also
suggests that leftist parties in Flanders would increase their vote share by
about 3 percentage points if, in the exceedingly unlikely event, compulsory
voting in Belgium was abolished.
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When it comes to explaining how our results point out that the left would
benefit from lower turnout levels or the abolition of compulsory voting, we
can only provide some tentative indications. Our analyses of the Dutch elec-
toral data suggest that we have to take into account different ideological
dimensions. If left and right would only be different when it comes to eco-
nomical issues, then leftist parties would potentially fare less well as turnout
decreases. It is on other dimensions, however, such as crime or migration
that abstainers are outspokenly right-leaning. As a consequence, the rise of
new dimensions of political conflict in Western Europe can be considered cru-
cial here (Kriesi et al., 2012). Before generalizing our results outside of the
low countries, therefore, it is essential that we take into account the political
space and the ideological dimensions on which left and right parties position
themselves.
An increase in vote share, however, does not necessarily translate into less
complicated and more stable governing coalitions. As Timmermans (2003)
shows, the length in words of coalition agreements in both Belgium and the
Netherlands has increased over time. As a result of the 1977 and 1982 elec-
tions in the Netherlands, the PvdA emerged as the largest party, but did not
form a governing coalition, as a deal with either the Christian Democrats or
the Liberals (VVD) was politically impossible (Timmermans and Andeweg,
2000, 370). Belgium is perhaps a more extreme case of this phenomenon;
parties more often enter office after electoral loses than victories (De Winter
et al., 2000, 352). The cabinet which emerged from a protracted series of
negotiations following the 2010 elections is, in this regard, typical. In this
instance, the New Flemish Alliance won the largest share of seats, but ul-
timately the runner-up Francophone Socialist Party formed a cabinet.8 In
short, the benefit of a larger vote share is moderated–and sometimes alto-
gether erased–by the dynamics of coalition formation.
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